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LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
Thomas M. Winn, III*
This article discusses four principal areas of employment and la-
bor law in which there was significant activity in Virginia's courts
and/or the legislature over the past year: (1) public policy wrongful
discharge; (2) negligent hiring, retention, and supervision; (3) em-
ployment references; and (4) covenants not to compete and the em-
ployee's fiduciary duties owed to the employer. Beyond the scope of
this article are decisions rendered in other areas of law affecting the
employment relationship, including workers' compensation,' unem-
ployment, wage payment,2 and public sector employment.'
* Associate, Woods, Rogers & Hazlegrove, P.L.C., Roanoke, Virginia. A.B., 1990,
Duke University;, J.D., cum laude, 1993, University of Richmond School of Law. Mr. Winn
gratefully acknowledges the research and editorial contributions of Alison Bales, a Sum-
mer Associate with the firm.
1. See, e.g., Combs v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 259 Va. 503, 525 S.E.2d 278 (2000)
(holding that workers' compensation exclusivity bar precludes civil action for negligence
where plaintiff injured with an aneurysm at work); Cooley v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 257 Va.
518, 514 S.E.2d 770 (1999) (holding that the plaintiff failed to prove he was terminated in
violation of Virginia Code section 65.2-308 solely because he intended to file a workers'
compensation claim).
2. See, e.g., Pallone v. Marshall Legacy Inst., 97 F. Supp. 2d 742, 746 (E.D. Va. 2000)
(holding that there is no private right of action under the Virginia Wage Payment Act);
Coley v. Historic Hotels, Inc., No. LF-1933-1, slip op. at 4 (Va. Cir. Ct. May 31, 2000)
(Richmond City) (holding that an agreement to repay a severance payment through a
wage deduction plan, even as a condition of reinstatement, does not violate the Virginia
Wage Payment Act).
3. See, e.g., Arlington County v. White, 259 Va. 708, 528 S.E.2d 706 (2000) (holding
that the county lacked authority under the Dillon rule to extend insurance coverage to
same-sex domestic partners under the county's self-funded health benefits plan); City of
Virginia Beach v. Hay, 258 Va. 217, 518 S.E.2d 314 (1999) (holding that the city properly
denied assistant city attorney access to the city's grievance procedure).
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I. CLAIMS OF WRONGFUL DISCHARGE IN
VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY4
Litigants continue to test the boundaries of the tort of wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy. Undaunted by the recent de-
fense victories in Doss v. Jamco Inc.,5 Dray v. New Market Poultry
Products, Inc.,6 and Connor v. National Pest Control Ass'n,7 creative
plaintiffs have continued to roam the legislative landscape for stat-
utes expressive of Virginia's "public policy." In many recent cases,
their search has not been in vain.
A. Virginia Human Rights Act/Discriminatory Discharge Claims'
In its 1994 decision in Lockhart v. Commonwealth Education Sys-
tems Corp.,' the Supreme Court of Virginia, in a four to three deci-
sion, ruled that employees could maintain wrongful discharge ac-
tions for racial and gender discrimination based on the public
policies underlying the Virginia Human Rights Act ("VHRA").'0 The
court reasoned that since the VHRA prohibits employment discrimi-
nation based on race and sex, employees discharged on the basis of
such protected characteristics could challenge their discharges in a
state tort action under the narrow public policy exception to em-
ployment-at-will announced in Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville. 1
The majority in Lockhart held that the public policy contained in the
4. For a comprehensive overview of the evolution of wrongful discharge in violation
of public policy claims, see generally Thomas R. Bagby & Thomas M. Winn, III, Connor v.
National Pest Control Association: The Death Knell for Public Policy Discriminatory Dis-
charge Claims?, 11 J. CIv. LrIG. 149 (Summer 1999); Thomas M. Winn, III, Annual Sur-
vey of Virginia Law: Employment Law, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 965 (1999); see also Thomas M.
Winn, III, The Supreme Court Opens the Back Door for Public Policy Discriminatory Dis-
charge Claims, 12 J. CIV. LITIG. 1 (Spring 2000).
5. 254 Va. 362, 492 S.E.2d 441 (1997).
6. 258 Va. 187, 518 S.E.2d 312 (1999).
7. 257 Va. 286, 513 S.E.2d 398 (1999).
8. For a more comprehensive overview of the evolution of public policy discrimina-
tory discharge claims, see Bagby & Winn, supra note 4.
9. 247 Va. 98, 439 S.E.2d 328(1994).
10. Id. at 106, 439 S.E.2d at 332. At that time, the VHRA provided, in pertinent part:
"It is the policy of the Commonwealth of Virginia: 1. To safeguard all individuals within
the Commonwealth from unlawful discrimination because of race, color, religion, national
origin, sex, pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions, age, marital status or dis-
ability.., in employment... ." VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-715 (Cum. Supp. 1994).
11. Lockhart, 247 Va. at 106, 439 S.E.2d at 332 (citing Bowman v. State Bank of
Keysville, 229 Va. 534, 331 S.E.2d 797 (1985)).
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VHRA supported a public policy discriminatory discharge claim, de-
spite what appeared to be clear language foreclosing causes of action
based on the policies expressed in the Act.
12
In response to Lockhart, the Virginia General Assembly promptly
amended the VHRA to provide:
A. Nothing in this chapter creates, nor shall it be construed to create,
an independent or private cause of action to enforce its provisions,
except as specifically provided in subsection B and C of this section.
B. No employer employing more than five but less than fifteen per-
sons shall discharge any such employee on the basis of race, color,
religion, national origin or sex, or of age if the employee is forty years
or older.
C. The employee may bring an action in a general district or circuit
court having jurisdiction over the employer who allegedly discharged
the employee in violation of this section. Any such action shall be
brought within 180 days from the date of the discharge. The court
may award up to twelve months' back pay with interest at the judg-
ment rate as provided in 6.1-330-54. However, if the court finds that
either party engaged in tactics to delay resolution of the complaint, it
may (i) diminish the award or (ii) award back pay to the date of
judgment without regard to the twelve-month limitation.
In any case where the employee prevails, the court shall award at-
torney's fees from the amount recovered, not to exceed twenty-five
percent of the back pay awarded. The court shall not award other
damages, compensatory or punitive, nor shall it order reinstatement
of the employee.
D. Causes of action based upon the public policies reflected in this
chapter shall be exclusively limited to those actions, procedures and
remedies, if any, afforded by applicable federal or state civil rights
statutes or local ordinances. Nothing in this section or 2.1-715 shall
be deemed to alter, supersede, or otherwise modify the authority of
the Council on Human Rights or of any local human rights or human
relations commissions .... 13
12. Id. At that time, the V.HRA provided, in pertinent part, that:
Nothing in this chapter creates, nor shall it be construed to create, an inde-
pendent or private cause of action to enforce its provisions. Nor shall the poli-
cies or provisions of this chapter be construed to allow tort actions to be insti-
tuted instead of or in addition to the current statutory actions for unlawful
discrimination.
VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-725 (Cum. Supp. 1994).
13. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-725 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
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While there is little or no legislative history in Virginia, the legis-
lature's intent in enacting the "Lockhart-Amendments" appeared to
be plain: to reverse Lockhart.4
In Doss v. Jamco Inc.,'5 the Supreme Court of Virginia confirmed
that the "Lockhart-Amendments" manifested the General Assembly's
intent to alter the common law and to limit actions based on viola-
tions of the policies reflected in the VHRA to applicable statutory
causes of action and remedies.' 6 The court concluded that permitting
the plaintiff to maintain a public policy claim based on alleged viola-
tions of the policy stated in the VERA would circumvent and render
meaningless the mandate of the amendments that actions for viola-
tions of such policies be "exclusively limited" to statutory causes of
action. 7 Thus, the court held that the 1995 amendments preclude
plaintiffs from relying on the policies reflected in the VHRA as the
basis for a common law claim for wrongful discharge. 8
In 1999, the Supreme Court of Virginia, in Conner v. National
Pest Control Ass'n., Inc.,' 9 held that the 1995 Amendments to the
VHRA preclude actions based on violations of public policies enunci-
ated in both the VHRA and other provisions of state, federal, or local
statutes or ordinances.2" In Connor, the plaintiff alleged that "her
termination constituted discrimination... based on her gender, and
that it violated the public policy against retaliation for complaints of
discrimination in employment as articulated in the VHRA and other
provisions of Virginia and federal law."2' In reaching its decision in
Connor, the court concluded, as it had in Doss, that the VHRA's "ex-
clusivity requirement would be circumvented and rendered mean-
ingless if [the plaintiff] could maintain her common law action based
upon an alleged violation of a policy enunciated in the VHRA by
simply citing a different Code section or other source of public policy
14. In three cases that arose before the enactment of the "Lockhart-Amendments," the
Supreme Court of Virginia held as actionable discharges based on: (1) disability discrimi-
nation, Bradick v. Grumman Data Sys. Corp., 254 Va. 156, 486 S.E.2d 545 (1997); (2) sex
discrimination, Bailey v. Scott-Gallaher, Inc., 253 Va. 121, 480 S.E.2d 502 (1997); and (3)
age discrimination, Clark v. Manheim Servs. Corp., 38 Va. Cir. 479 (1996).
15. 254 Va. 362, 492 S.E.2d 441 (1997).
16. Id. at 371, 492 S.E.2d at 446.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. 257 Va. 286, 513 S.E.2d 398 (1999).
20. Id. at 290, 513 S.E.2d at 400.
21. Id. at 288, 513 S.E.2d at 399.
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which enunciated the same policy."22 Moreover, the court noted that
the General Assembly made "statutory causes of action the exclusive
avenues for pursuing a remedy for an alleged violation of any public
policy 'reflected in' the VBRA... regardless of whether the policy is
articulated elsewhere."' Accordingly, the supreme court affirmed
the dismissal of plaintiffs claim.'
After the Doss and Connor decisions, it appeared to some com-
mentators that public policy discriminatory discharge claims were no
longer available under Virginia common law. Management-side la-
bor and employment attorneys assumed that the long-term effects of
Doss and Connor would be to channel employment discrimination
claims against employers with fifteen or more employees back
through the administrative procedures contemplated by the federal
anti-discrimination statutes and that employees of certain small em-
ployers could be required to resort to the limited claims of employ-
ment discrimination specifically afforded by the VHRA. In short,
management-side labor and employment attorneys assumed that the
result of Doss and Connor would be to return the state of the law to
its position prior to Lockhart,26 with the addition of a limited statu-
tory claim applicable only to certain small employers. 27 After the Su-
preme Court of Virginia's recent decision in Mitchem v. Counts,2'
however, it would appear that each of those assumptions is incorrect
and, instead, uncertainty once again reigns supreme in this area of
the law.
1. A New Breed of Public Policy Discrimination Claims
On January 14, 2000, the Supreme Court of Virginia rendered its
decision in Mitchem v. Counts.29 The supreme court addressed two
issues: (1) whether the VERA bars a common law action for wrongful
discharge based on a violation of public policy not reflected in the
22. Id. at 289, 513 S.E.2d at 400.
23. Id. at 289-90, 513 S.E.2d at 400.
24. Id. at 290, 513 S.E.2d at 400.
25. E.g., Bagby & Winn, supra note 4; Winn, The Supreme Court Opens the Back Door
for Public Policy Discriminatory Discharge Claims, supra note 4; Winn, Annual Survey of
Virginia Law: Employment Law, supra note 4.
26. See, e.g., Winn, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Employment Law, supra note 4, at
977.
27. Id.
28. 259 Va. 179, 523 S.E.2d 246(2000).
29. Id. at 179, 523 S.E.2d at 246.
2000]
912 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:907
VHRA, when the conduct alleged also violates a public policy re-
flected in the VHRA and (2) whether a violation of the public policies
embodied in two criminal statutes may support such a common law
action.3" In Mitchem, the plaintiff alleged that her former employer
had discharged her after she refused to engage in a sexual relation-
ship with him." She also alleged that on many occasions the defen-
dant "massaged her shoulders, patted her buttocks, touched her leg,
rubbed her knee, and hugged her against her will."
3 2
Count I of the plaintiffs motion for judgment was a claim "that
her discharge violated the Commonwealth's public policy 'that all
persons.., are entitled to pursue and maintain employment free of
discrimination based upon gender" and that the "public policy is
violated when a female employee 'must either consent to the com-
mission of a crime against her person, or engage in a conspiracy to
commit a crime, or both, to maintain her employment.'"33 In support
of her claim, the plaintiff cited several sources of public policy in-
cluding the VHRA and several Virginia Code provisions relating to
battery,34 fornication," and lewd and lascivious cohabitation.36 The
trial court sustained the defendant's demurrer to Count I, concluding
that the 1995 amendments to the VHRA eliminated the VHRA as a
source of public policy to support a common law wrongful discharge
action and the criminal code sections cited by the plaintiff did not ar-
ticulate public policies that supported the claim.37
On appeal, the plaintiff contended that she was discharged from
employment because she rejected her employer's alleged demands
that she perform sexual acts in violation of the aforementioned
criminal code provisions and because she would not consent to the
commission of a battery upon her person.3" The defendant contended
that the plaintiffs allegations, if proven, would violate the public
policies reflected in the VHRA and, therefore, could not support a
wrongful discharge claim and that, in any event, criminal statutes




34. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57 (Repl. Vol. 1996).
35. Id. § 18.2-344 (Repl. Vol. 1996).
36. Id. § 18.2-345 (Repl. Vol. 1996).
37. Mitchem, 259 Va. at 183-84, 523 S.E.2d at 248.
38. Id. at 184, 523 S.E.2d at 249. At oral argument, the plaintiff withdrew her reli-
ance on the VHRA as a source of public policy. Id.
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do not "announce public policies in their texts," and thus, cannot
support a wrongful discharge claim."
a. The Majority Opinion
Justice Keenan, writing for the majority, began her analysis with
the VBRA, noting that its preclusive provision in "Code § 2.1-725(D)
is the controlling statute in this appeal."4" As noted above, Virginia
Code section 2.1-725(D) provides in pertinent part: "Causes of action
based upon the public policies reflected in this chapter shall be ex-
clusively limited to those actions, procedures and remedies, if any,
afforded by applicable federal or state civil rights statutes or local
ordinances."4' While the majority acknowledged its prior holdings in
Doss and Connor, it distinguished these holdings from Virginia Code
section 2.1-725(D), explaining:
In those cases, unlike the present case, the plaintiffs did not identify
any public policy different from those reflected in the VHRA as the
basis for their common law claims. Thus, in those cases, we did not
address the central issue in the present appeal, whether Code § 2.1-
725(D) bars a common law action for wrongful termination based on
public policies not reflected in the VHRA, when the conduct alleged
in the motion for judgment also violates a public policy reflected in
the VHRA.
42
In evaluating whether the preclusive language of Virginia Code
section 2.1-725(D) barred the plaintiffs claim, the majority first
noted that Virginia Code section 2.1-725(D) was "enacted... in
derogation of the common law" and "must be strictly construed."
43
The majority observed in this regard that "[a] statutory change in
the common law is limited to that which is expressly stated in the
statute or necessarily implied by its language because there is a pre-
sumption that no change was intended.' Thus, the majority con-
cluded that Virginia Code section 2.1-725(D) abrogated the common
law wrongful discharge claim only to the extent such claims are
39. Id. at 185, 523 S.E.2d at 249.
40. Id.
41. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-725(D) (Repl. Vol. 1995).
42. Mitchem, 259 Va. at 186, 523 S.E.2d at 250.
43. Id. (citing Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Kinzer, 206 Va. 175, 181, 142 S.E.2d 514,
518 (1965)).
44 Id. (citing Boyd v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 346, 349, 374 S.E.2d 301, 302 (1988);
Strother v. Lynchburg Trust & Say. Bank, 155 Va. 826, 833, 156 S.E. 426, 428 (1931)).
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based on public policies (i.e., sex) reflected in the VHRA.4" In doing
so, the majority rejected the defendant's contention that the claim
was precluded because the alleged conduct also violated the public
policy in the VHRA against gender discrimination.46
The majority next rejected the defendant's contention that the
public policies embodied in Virginia Code sections 18.1-344 and 18.1-
345 cannot support a common law action for wrongful termination
because those statutes do not expressly state such public policies.47
The majority explained:
We find no merit in this contention. Laws that do not expressly state
a public policy, but were enacted to protect the property rights, per-
sonal freedoms, health, safety, or welfare of the general public, may
support a wrongful discharge claim if they further an underlying, es-
tablished public policy that is violated by the discharge from em-
ployment.
The majority limited this sweeping statement by citing Dray v.
New Market Poultry Products, Inc.49 and emphasizing that to rely
upon such a statute a plaintiff must be a member of the class of per-
sons the specific policy was designed to protect.5 ° The majority noted
in this regard that the cited criminal statutes were enacted for the
protection of the general public and that the plaintiff thus was a
member of that class of persons whom the statutes were designed to
protect." Accordingly, the court held that plaintiffs wrongful dis-
charge claim was actionable to the extent it relied on Virginia Code
sections 18.1-344 and 18.1-345.52
Finally, the majority agreed with the defendant that the plaintiff
could not rely on Virginia Code section 18.1-57 (assault and battery)
as a source of public policy upon which to base her wrongful dis-
45. Id. at 187, 523 S.E.2d at 250.
46. Id. The majority rejected the defendant's argument on three bases: (1) the plain
language of the statute does not provide for such preclusion; (2) the same conduct can sup-
port more than one theory of recovery; and (3) when extended to its logical conclusion, an
employer would be permitted to discharge any employee who refuses to commit a crime
(e.g., cross burning or painting a swastika on a synagogue) at the employer's direction, as
long as the employer's conduct also violates a public policy reflected in the VHRA (dis-
crimination based on race or religion). Id. at 187-88, 523 S.E.2d at 250-51.
47. Id. at 189, 523 S.E.2d at 251.
48. Id.
49. 258 Va. 187, 518 S.E.2d 312 (1999).
50. Mitchem, 259 Va. at 189, 523 S.E.2d at 251-52.
51. Id. at 189, 523 S.E.2d at 252.
52. Id. at 190, 523 S.E.2d at 252.
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charge claim.53 The plaintiff alleged that she was fired for refusing to
"consent to commission of a battery upon her person."54 The majority
implicitly distinguished Virginia Code section 18.1-57 from Virginia
Code sections 18.1-344 and 18.1-345 insofar as the crime of assault
and battery presumes a lack of consent, whereas consent is irrele-
vant to the crimes of fornication and lewd and lascivious cohabita-
tion.55
b. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Kinser, with whom Chief Justice Carrico and Justice
Compton joined, authored the dissenting opinion. Justice Kinser be-
gan by noting the similarity of the plaintiffs claim to the claim al-
leged by the plaintiff in Lockhart.56 Justice Kinser further pointed
out that after Lockhart, the court consistently has characterized the
conduct to which the plaintiff in Lockhart was subjected as "gender
discrimination."5' This point was critical to the dissent because
even though Mitchem disavows any reliance on the V.-RA, the sex-
ual harassment that she allegedly endured prior to discharge, as
well as Counts' termination of her employment because she refused
to have a sexual relationship with him, if proven true, would violate
53. Id. at 190-91, 523 S.E.2d at 252-53.
54. Id. at 191, 523 S.E.2d at 252-53. The court appeared to draw a meaningful distinc-
tion between an allegation that an employee was discharged for refusing to commit the
crime and an allegation that she was fired for refusing to consent to the commission of a
crime. See id. at 190-91, 523 S.E.2d at 252-53. The implication being that a discharge for
refusing to commit the crime of assault and battery may state a claim. Other decisions
have blurred or outright ignored this subtle but dispositive distinction. See Peyton v.
United S. Aluminum Prods., Inc., 49 Va. Cir. 187 (Cir. Ct. 1999) (Richmond City) (recog-
nizing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57 (Repl. Vol. 1996) (assault and battery) and VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-67.4 (Repl. Vol. 1996) (sexual battery) as viable sources of public policy, but failing
to address explicitly whether the discharge was for refusing to consent, as opposed to re-
fusing to commit, the crimes).
55. See Mitchem, 259 Va. at 191, 523 S.E.2d at 252-53.
56. Id. at 192, 523 S.E.2d at 253 (Kinser, J., dissenting). Justice Kinser noted that
Wright alleged that her employer "approached her from behind, kissed her
cheek and" 'physically seized her, grabbed her and hugged her without her
consent.'" She also alleged that her employer repeatedly made abusive, inap-
propriate, and harassing remarks to her, and ultimately told her "get out" af-
ter she advised her employer that she did not intend to be subjected to that
kind of treatment at work.
Id. at 192, 523 S.E.2d at 253-54 (Kinser, J., dissenting)(quoting Lockhart, 247
Va. at 101-02, 439 S.E.2d at 329-30).
57. Id. at 193, 523 S.E.2d at 254 (Kinser, J., dissenting) (citing Bailey v. Scott-
Gallaher, Inc., 253 Va. 121, 126, 480 S.E.2d 502, 505 (1997); Lawrence Chrysler Plymouth
Corp. v. Brooks, 251 Va. 94, 98, 465 S.E.2d 806, 809 (1996)).
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a public policy reflected in the VHRA. The distinction that Mitchem
attempts to make and which the majority accepts, that she was fired,
not because of "sex," but because she refused to engage in conduct
that would have violated certain criminal statutes, merely places a
different label on "sex" discrimination and thus exalts form over sub-
stance. The re-labeling of her claim does nothing to alter the facts
alleged by Mitchem or the law governing those allegations.
58
Relying on the court's decision in Connor, Justice Kinser opined
that
an at-will employee in Virginia cannot maintain a cause of action
based on the public policy exception to the at-will employment doc-
trine if the public policy is one that is "reflected" in the VHRA, even
when the employee does not rely on or cite the VERA because the
policy is found in other statutes.
Because the defendant's alleged conduct, if proven, would violate
policies "reflected" in the VHRA, Justice Kinser concluded that the
plaintiffs "[clauseD of action [is one] based upon the public policies
reflected in [the VHRA]," despite her attempt to place a different la-
bel on her cause of action.6 °
More fundamentally, and practically for employers in Virginia,
Justice Kinser expressed concern that the majority's decision would
create[] an avenue through which all employees asserting allegations
similar to Mitchem's can bypass the General Assembly's clear intent,
as expressed in Code § 2.1-725(D), to "abrogate the common law with
respect to causes of action for unlawful termination of employment
based upon the public polices reflected in the [VHRA]." 5'
2. Future Implications of Mitchem
After Connor, it appeared that public policy discriminatory dis-
58. Id. at 193-94, 523 S.E.2d at 254 (Kinser, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 194-95, 523 S.E.2d at 255 (Kinser, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 195, 523 S.E.2d at 255 (Kinser, J., dissenting) (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-
725(D) (Repl. Vol. 1995)).
61. Id. (Kinser, J., dissenting) (quoting Doss, 254 Va. at 372, 492 S.E.2d at 447). Jus-
tice Kinser also took issue with the majority's hypothetical examples concerning the dis-
charge of an employee for refusing to engage in cross-burning or painting a swastika on a
synagogue. See id. at 195-96, 523 S.E.2d at 255-56 (Kinser, J., dissenting). Justice Kinser
pointed out that the discharges would not be in violation of the policies reflected in the
VHRA (and thus would be actionable) because the employer's act of discrimination based
on race or religion would not be directed toward the employee, but instead would be di-
rected toward a third party. Id. at 196, 523 S.E.2d at 255-56 (Kinser, J., dissenting).
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charge claims no longer should have been available under Virginia
common law. Mitchem, however, creates a new avenue for creative
plaintiffs' counsel to assert common law discriminatory discharge
claims involving allegations of sexual harassment. Mitchem-type
claims, like Lockhart-type claims previously, undoubtedly will
emerge as the claim du jour for plaintiffs' counsel seeking to avoid
the restrictions inherent in claims asserted under federal anti-
discrimination laws.
Mitchem-type discriminatory discharge actions differ from federal
actions in a number of critical ways. For example, while Title VII
applies to employers with at least fifteen employees,62 Mitchem-type
wrongful discharge actions contain no such restriction. Title VII also
provides caps on compensatory and punitive damages,63 but a
Mitchem-type action is not bound by such caps. Indeed, after
Mitchem, employers in Virginia face potential liability for certain
claims of sexual harassment greatly exceeding potential exposure
under the federal acts. For example, under the Civil Rights Act of
1991, compensatory and punitive damages are capped from $50,000
to $300,000 depending on the size of the employer.' Although Vir-
ginia Code section 8.01-38.1 caps punitive damages at $350,000,65
there is no compensatory damage ceiling. Thus, after Mitchem, the
smallest Virginia employer is exposed to potentially unlimited dam-
ages while the largest non-Virginia employer has compensatory and
punitive damages capped under Title VII at $300,000.
Moreover, Title VII claims require the filing of an administrative
charge, an agency investigation, and attempts at voluntary concilia-
tion before a lawsuit may be filed,66 but Mitchem-type actions pres-
ent no such prerequisites to suit. Finally, although federal adminis-
trative charges must be filed within 300 days,67 a longer statute of
limitations applies to wrongful discharge cases.6" Finally, and per-
haps most significantly, the virtual unavailability of summary judg-
ment in state court, as opposed to the well-established body of sum-
62. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994).
63. Id. § 1981a(a)-(b) (1994).
64. Id. § 1981a(b)(3) (1994).
65. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1994).
67. Id.
68. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-248 (Repl. Vol. 2000) (applying a two-year statute of limita-
tions to wrongful discharge claims arising on or after July 1, 1995); Purcell v. Tidewater
Constr. Corp., 250 Va. 93, 95, 458 S.E.2d 291, 293 (1995).
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mary judgment precedent in federal court, looms as a significant
hazard for employers after Mitchem.
While Mitchem involved allegations of sexual harassment and dis-
crimination, plaintiffs certainly will attempt to identify additional
state criminal or other statutes that express policies on which claims
of other types of harassment and discrimination may be based.69 It
remains to be seen whether the General Assembly will respond
swiftly to Mitchem with the decisiveness that led to the 1995
Amendments to the VHRA. Until such order is restored, employers
potentially face significantly enhanced risks in the defense of dis-
criminatory discharge claims, particularly those involving allega-
tions of sexual harassment.
B. Public Policy Wrongful Discharge Claims Based on Other
Civil and Criminal Statutes
Aside from claims seeking to redress alleged discriminatory dis-
charges, plaintiffs over the past year have had mixed results in their
attempts to rely on various other civil and criminal statutes as ex-
pressions of "public policy" on which to ground public policy wrongful
discharge claims.
1. Cases Rejecting Such Claims
In Dray v. New Market Poultry,"° the Supreme Court of Virginia
rejected the plaintiffs attempted reliance on the Virginia Meat and
Poultry Products Inspection Act"' in support of a wrongful termina-
tion claim because the Act "does not confer any rights or duties upon
her or any other similarly situated employee of the defendant."72 The
court later reaffirmed Dray in City of Virginia Beach v. Harris,7 a
case decided on the same day as Mitchem.
In Harris, the supreme court rejected a discharged police officer's
attempted reliance on Virginia Code section 18.2-460 (obstruction of
69. See, e.g., Winn, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Employment Law, supra note 4, at
977-85.
70. 258 Va. 187, 518 S.E.2d 312 (1999).
71. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 3.1-884.17 to -884.35 (Repl. Vol. 1994 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
72. Dray, 258 Va. at 191, 518 S.E.2d at 314.
73. 259 Va. 220, 523 S.E.2d 239 (2000).
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justice) and Virginia Code section 15.1-138 (enumerating duties of
police officers).74 The court began its analysis by stating that it had
"found a public policy sufficient to allow a common law wrongful dis-
charge claim to go forward as an exception to the employment-at-will
doctrine in only two instances."75 The court then proceeded to define
the parameters for a cognizable statutory source of public policy:
The first instance involves laws containing explicit statements of
public policy (e.g. "It is the public policy of the Commonwealth of
Virginia [that] .. I.). The second one involves laws that do not ex-
plicitly state a public policy, but instead are designed to protect the
"property rights, personal freedoms, health, safety or welfare of the
people in general." Such laws must be in furtherance of "an [under-
lying] established public policy" that the discharge from employment
violates.
76
Once a plaintiff has satisfied the court that a statute is a viable
source of public policy, the plaintiff then must demonstrate that he
or she is "a member of the class of individuals that the specific public
policy is intended to benefit in order to state a claim."7
The court explained that Virginia Code section 18.2-460 "does not*
explicitly state any public policy, but like all criminal statutes, it has
as an underlying policy the protection of the public's safety and wel-
fare."78 On the other hand, the court explained, Virginia Code section
15.1-138 merely describes the powers and duties of a police force and
was not designed to protect any public rights pertaining to "prop-
erty.. ., personal freedoms, health, safety, or welfare."79 Accordingly,
the court reversed the judgment of the circuit court and entered final
judgment in favor of the defendants on the grounds that the statutes
relied upon by the plaintiff "do not fit within either of the instances
where we have found public policies that support a Bowman-type
cause of action.""0
In Francis v. Computer Learning Centers, Inc.,81 the Fourth Cir-
cuit, citing Dray, also affirmed the dismissal of a public policy
74. Id. at 233-34, 523 S.E.2d at 245-46.
75. Id. at 232, 523 S.E.2d at 245.
76. Id. at 233, 523 S.E.2d at 245 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 233, 523 S.E.2d at 246.
79. Id. at 234, 523 S.E.2d at 246 (quoting Miller v. SEVAMP, Inc., 234 Va. 462, 468,
362 S.E.2d 915, 918 (1987)).
80. Id. at 233, 523 S.E.2d at 245-46.
81. No. 98-2801, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 26998 (4th Cir. Oct. 27, 1999) (per curiam).
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wrongful discharge claim. 2 In Francis, the plaintiff alleged he was
terminated for refusing to participate in his employer's allegedly il-
legal and fraudulent activities.83 Specifically, the plaintiff contended
that he was discharged after being asked to contribute $1,000 to the
re-election campaign of a politician and then submit to the company
a bogus reimbursement of that amount.' The plaintiff contended
that his discharge violated Virginia public policy as embodied in the
Virginia Consumer Protection Act85 and certain regulations of the
State Council of Higher Education for Virginia enacted pursuant to
Virginia statute.86 In affirming the dismissal of plaintiffs claim, the
court did not reach the issue of whether the statutes in question
were cognizable sources of policy, instead holding that the plaintiff
did not fall within the "zone of interests that the relevant [statute
and regulations] set out to protect," even assuming they were other-
wise valid sources of public policy."
2. Cases Recognizing Such Claims
In King v. Donnkenny, Inc.,"8 the plaintiff alleged that she was
terminated after she reported first to her supervisor, and ultimately
to the company's president, that certain corporate officers were en-
gaged in an illegal accounting scheme designed to fraudulently in-
flate the company's stock prices.8 9 The plaintiff alleged that the offi-
cers' conduct violated Virginia Code section 13.1-502 (fraudulent
offer or sale of securities) and that she had been terminated for "re-
fusing] to participate in violating the law."9" In allowing the claim to
go forward, the United States District Court for the Western District
of Virginia noted, "Virginia courts are becoming increasingly sympa-
thetic toward plaintiffs who are fired for bringing an employer's
criminal transgressions to light where the underlying public policy
in outlawing the conduct dictates that citizens are entitled to live
82. Id. at *1.
83. Id. at *1-2.
84. Id. at *2.
85. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-196 to -207 (Repl. Vol. 1998 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
86. Francis, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 26998, at *2.
87. Id. at *3.
88. 84 F. Supp. 2d 736 (W.D. Va. 2000).
89. Id. at 738.
90. Id. at 740.
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free from such activity."9'
In McGee v. Williamsburg Townhouses,92 the Norfolk Circuit
Court overruled the defendant's demurrer to a wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy claim that was grounded upon Virginia
Code section 36-96.5, which prohibits threatening, coercing, intimi-
dating or interfering with any person's exercise or enjoyment of any
right granted or protected by Virginia's Fair Housing Act.93 Holding
sub silentio that the statute in question was a viable source of public
policy, the court held that the facts as alleged in the lawsuit indi-
cated that the plaintiffs discharge may have been the result of her
"aid[ing] or encourag[ing] any other person in the exercise or enjoy-
ment of, any rights granted or protected" by the Virginia Fair
Housing Act.94
In Anderson v. ITT Industries Corp.,95 the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia traced the development of
the tort, analytically distilled the extant caselaw to its essence and
allowed a plaintiff to proceed in reliance on alleged violations of two
criminal statutes.96 The plaintiff contended that he had been dis-
charged for refusing to falsify resumes to be submitted pursuant to
bids on government contracts.97 The court began its analysis by set-
ting forth the parameters of the claim, consistent with the Supreme
Court of Virginia's holding in Harris, as follows:
[S]tatutes embodying a public policy sufficient to form the basis of a
wrongful discharge claim fall into two categories. The first is a stat-
ute stating explicitly that it expresses a public policy of the Com-
monwealth. The second, far more common category consists of stat-
utes that do not explicitly state a public policy, but rather "are
designed to protect the property rights, personal freedoms, health,
safety or welfare of the people in general," and thereby further an
underlying established public policy that is violated by the discharge
91 Id; see also Dye v. Matewan Bancshares, Inc., No. CL 98-261, slip op. at 2 (Va. Cir.
Ct. May 10, 2000) (Tazewell County) (denying demurrer and stating that "[i]t is inconceiv-
able that an employer requiring an employee to commit criminal acts in order to keep her
job is not against the public policy of the Commonwealth of Virginia" in cases involving
alleged termination in retaliation for refusal to perform securities sales work in violation
of Virginia Code sections 13.1-501 through 13.1-527.3); VA. LAW. WKLY., June 12, 2000, A-
12 (discussing Dye).
92. No. L99-2574, slip op. at 1-2 (Va. Cir. Ct. Feb. 25,2000) (Norfolk City).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 2.
95. 92 F. Supp. 2d 516 (E.D. Va. 2000).
96. See id. at 520-23.
97. Id. at 517.
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at issue. Yet, even if a statute falls within one of these categories, it
may not serve as the basis of a Bowman claim, unless the aggrieved
employee also shows that he or she is a member of the class of indi-
viduals the public policy is intended to benefit. In other words, to
state a Bowman claim, the discharged employee must show that he
or she "fell within the protective reach of the statute which supplied
the public policy component of his or her claim."9 8
The court observed that Virginia Code sections 18.2-172 (forgery)
and 18.2-178 (obtaining money by false pretenses), the criminal
statutes upon which the plaintiff based her claim, were "clearly de-
signed to protect the welfare and property rights of the general pub-
lic."99
The defendant contended that the plaintiff was not within the
statutes' protective reach because the statutes were designed to pro-
tect the victims of the crimes in question, and the plaintiff would not
have been the victim of the crimes had he consummated them.'00 The
court, citing Mitchem, dispensed with this argument, observing:
Like the plaintiff in Mitchem, plaintiff here was discharged for alleg-
edly refusing to engage in conduct prohibited by a Virginia criminal
statute. And, like the plaintiff in Mitchem, plaintiff here falls within
the class of individuals the statutes relied on were designed to pro-
tect, because the statutes imposed upon plaintiff a legal duty not to
engage in the prohibited conduct. Mitchem and Dray make clear that
an employee does not have to be the victim of the crime he or she is
asked to commit to fall within the statute's protective reach. Rather,
it is sufficient that the statute imposes upon the employee a duty not
to engage in the conduct ordered by the employer. The statutes
plaintiff cites plainly imposed a duty on him not to commit the
crimes of forgery or obtaining money under false pretenses. As a re-
sult, plaintiff is within those statutes' protective reach and he states
a valid Bowman wrongful discharge claim where, as here, he alleges
that his employer fired him for refusing to engage in statutorily pro-
hibited conduct.
10 1
Anderson would appear to be an accurate analysis of the current
state of the law of wrongful discharge after Dray, Harris, and
Mitchem and provides a helpful roadmap for assessing the validity of
such claims in Virginia.
98. Id. at 520-21 (quoting City of Virginia Beach v. Harris, 259 Va. 220, 232, 523
S.E.2d 239, 245 (2000) and Leverton v. Allied Signal, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 486, 493 (E.D. Va.
1998)).
99. Id. at 521.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 523.
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II. NEGLIGENCE IN HIRING, RETENTION, AND SUPERVISION
Tort actions in which the employer is alleged to be responsible for
the acts of its employees continue to receive increasing attention in
the Virginia courts as plaintiffs seek tort remedies for alleged
wrongs arising out of the employment relationship as an alternative
to, or in addition to, pursuing federal remedies. Outgrowths of the
doctrine of respondeat superior, claims of negligent hiring, negligent
retention, and negligent supervision are becoming more common-
place and were actively litigated in Virginia courts this year.
In Goforth v. Office Max, °2 the Norfolk Circuit Court addressed
two alleged instances of tortious conduct against the plaintiff by an
employee of Office Max."0 3 When the first allegedly tortious act oc-
curred, the plaintiff was a customer/invitee at Big Lots, a store ad-
joining the Office Max where the employee worked. °4 While the de-
fendant was on a break from his job at Office Max, he went to Big
Lots and allegedly committed a battery against the plaintiff on Big
Lots's premises.'0 5
The second tortious act purportedly occurred when the plaintiff
later entered Office Max as an invitee and encountered the defen-
dant, who was still employed by Office Max." 6 While the plaintiff
and a friend shopped, the defendant allegedly followed them and
from time to time made facial and body gestures toward the plain-
tiff.'O On the issues of negligent hiring and retention, the jury re-
turned a verdict for the plaintiff.' Thereafter, Office Max moved for
a new trial or summary judgment.0 9
Office Max cited three grounds for its motion pertaining to the
battery at Big Lots: (1) it did not owe a duty to the plaintiff for the
defendant's criminal act committed at Big Lots; (2) it was not negli-
gent in hiring the defendant; and (3) even if it were negligent in
hiring the defendant, its negligence was not the proximate cause of
the plaintiffs injury."0 The court did not examine the latter two is-
sues, as they were fact questions properly left to the jury, but it did
102. 48 Va. Cir. 463 (Cir. Ct. 1999) (Norfolk City).
103. Id. at 468.
104. Id. at 464.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 468.
107. Id.




924 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:907
determine that Office Max owed the plaintiff no legal duty when she
was battered at Big Lots."'
In so deciding, the court stated that an employer was not "the in-
surer of the employee's behavior,"" 2 but that liability for negligent
hiring occurs when it should have been foreseeable that the em-
ployee posed a threat of injury to others because of the circum-
stances of the employment."' The court observed that three factors
are typically present when an employer has a duty to a third party:
(1) "the plaintiff and the employee were both rightfully in the place
the tort occurred;"" 4 (2) "the plaintiff met the employee as a direct
result of his employment;"" 5 and (3) "the employer must have re-
ceived some benefit, even if only potential or indirect, from the
meeting between plaintiff and employee."" 6 The court decided that
because these three factors did not exist, Office Max was not liable
for the incident at Big Lots." 7
The court then turned to the encounter between the plaintiff and
the defendant at Office Max. The plaintiffs claim of negligent reten-
tion against Office Max was based on the torts of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, stalking, and assault."' First, the court
stated that damages for emotional distress could not be awarded in
the absence of some physical impact unless the conduct was willful
and wanton." 9 Although the court indicated Office Max's retention of
the defendant could have been negligent, it was not willful and wan-
ton, and therefore, the store was not liable for the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress. 20 Second, the court acknowledged
that stalking is a crime in Virginia, but determined there was no
private right of action for stalking.'2 ' Since the defendant could not
be civilly liable for stalking, the court refused to hold Office Max li-
able.'22 Finally, the court examined the claim of assault and found
that although no assault occurred when the defendant followed the
111. Id.
112. Id. at 465.
113. Id. (citing Ponticas v. K.M.S. Inv., 331 N.W.2d 907 (Minn. 1983)).




118. Id. at 468-69.
119. Id. at 468.
120. Id. at 469.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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plaintiff through the store, one may have occurred when he ap-
proached her with his arms raised."' Office Max may have been li-
able for this tort based on its negligent retention of the defendant."2
In the final analysis, the court set aside the verdict because the
jury was improperly permitted to hold Office Max liable for the inci-
dent at Big Lots. 25 It ordered a new trial to determine whether Of-
fice Max was liable for the incident at Office Max and what damages
were appropriate.
26
The issues of negligent hiring and retention also were addressed
in Stansfield v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.'12 In that case, the
plaintiff alleged that she was raped and sodomized by an employee
of MSS, Inc., an agent of Goodyear. 2 The plaintiff met the employee
when she brought her car to MSS for maintenance; the employee
drove her home while her car was repaired and picked her up when
it was ready.129 She had never met the employee before then, and the
two had no contact from the time of the meeting until the attack
about four months later.3 ° The plaintiff alleged that both MSS and
Goodyear were liable for her injuries because of their negligent hir-
ing and retention of the employee.' 3 '
The employee filled out an application before he was hired, admit-
ting that he had been convicted of distributing a controlled danger-
ous substance. 32 Had MSS completed a background check on the
employee, it would have learned that the employee also had convic-
tions for robbery with a deadly weapon (three counts) and use of a
handgun in the commission of a felony (three counts). 3 The plaintiff
argued that MSS failed to exercise reasonable care when it did not
investigate the crime the employee had admitted or his background
as a whole. 13
4
In its ruling on defendants' demurrers, the court stated that even
123. Id. at 469-70.
124. Id. at 470.
125. Id.
126, Id.
127. No. 21924, 1999 WL 1419253 (Va. Cir. Ct. Oct. 13, 1999) (Loudoun County).
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if MSS had performed a background check, it would not have had no-
tice of the employee's propensity to commit sexual assault.135 Fur-
thermore, no fact pleaded by the plaintiff indicated that MSS was
put on notice after hiring the employee that he might commit a sex-
ual assault. 3 For those reasons, the court decided that claims of
negligent hiring and retention against MSS and Goodyear must
fail. 37 The court sustained the demurrers and entered final judg-
ment in favor of the defendants. 138
In Permison v. Vastera, Inc.,' 3 the plaintiff, an employee of
Vastera, alleged that he was assaulted and verbally threatened by
another employee while he (the plaintiff) was being fired. 4 ' He as-
serted claims of negligent hiring, negligent retention, and negligent
supervision.'' In its demurrer, Vastera argued that the first two
claims were insufficiently alleged in the motion for judgment.'
Vastera argued that the third claim failed because Virginia does not
recognize negligent supervision as a legitimate cause of action."
The court agreed that Virginia law is clear in its rejection of an
independent cause of action for negligent supervision, citing Chesa-
peake & Potomac Telephone Co. v. Dowdy,"4 and, accordingly, sus-
tained the demurrer on the third count.'45 The court declined to
permit the plaintiff to amend the motion for judgment because the
Virginia Workers' Compensation Act provided the exclusive remedy
for workers injured by an intentional tort of a co-worker. 46 The
plaintiff was in the process of being terminated when the alleged in-
cident occurred, and, as such, he was still an employee of Vastera
135. Id. at *2.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at *1.





144. 235 Va. 55, 365 S.E.2d 751 (1988) (declining to recognize the tort of negligent su-
pervision or impose a duty of reasonable care upon an employer in the supervision of its
employees); see also Call v. Shaw Jewelers, Inc., No. 3:98CV449, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
636 (E.D. Va. Jan. 7, 1999) (unpublished decision); Courtney v. Ross Stores, Inc., 45 Va.
Cir. 429, 432 (Cir. Ct. 1998) (Fairfax County) (explaining that "[iun Virginia there is no
duty of reasonable care imposed upon an employer in the supervision of its employees un-
der these circumstances and we will not create one here").
145. See Permison, No. 23096, slip op. at 2.
146. See id. (citing Haddon v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 239 Va. 397, 389 S.E.2d 712 (1990)).
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who must seek a remedy pursuant to the Workers' Compensation
Act. Accordingly, the motion for judgment was dismissed.147
III. EMPLOYMENT REFERENCES
Prudent employers historically have been reluctant to provide
prospective employers detailed and accurate assessments of the per-
formance and conduct of their former employees. This reluctance
generally is born of a fear of liability for defamation claims.' Out of
concern for such claims, employers often refuse to provide any in-
formation other than name, rank and serial number in employment
references. This practice inhibits a prospective employer's ability to
gather important information about an applicant. To further compli-
cate matters, employers may be held liable for negligent references
resulting from their failure to disclose information relating to a for-
mer employee's violent acts, other criminal conduct or unfitness to
perform a particular job.
Presumably to address these issues and to encourage greater
sharing of helpful and important information among employers, the
Virginia legislature recently passed, and Governor Gilmore signed,
House Bill 1126 which offers employers limited immunity for com-
municating job-related information about an employee to a prospec-
tive or current employer.'49 The new law provides:
[A]ny employer who, upon request by a person's prospective or cur-
rent employer, furnishes information about that person's profes-
sional conduct, reasons for separation or job performance, includ-
ing... information contained in any written performance
evaluations, shall be immune from civil liability.., provided that
the employer is not acting in bad faith ... or with reckless disregard
for whether [the information] is false.
150
Punitive damages may be awarded if the employer acts in bad
faith. 15'
The immunity would apply when a prospective or current em-
147. Id.
148. See, e.g., Doran v. Sigmon, No. 97-0023-D, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6219 (W.D. Va.
Mar. 23, 1998) (holding that a private healthcare agency could be liable for allegedly de-
famatory comments made about an ex-employee by its office manager); Eslami v. Global
One Communications, Inc., 48 Va. Cir. 17, 23 (Cir. Ct. 1999) (Fairfax County) (overruling
the defendant's demurrer to a defamation claim; statements that employee "did not fit in"
and "lost his temper" could constitute the basis of a defamation claim).
149. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-46.1 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
150. Id. § 8.01-46.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 2000).
15L Id. § 8.01-46.1(B) (Repl. Vol. 2000).
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ployer requests information about an individual.'52 The immunity
would not apply to statements volunteered to others or to informa-
tion communicated to someone other than a prospective or current
employer.'53 The potential scope of the immunity is broad in that it
would protect entities with one or more employee(s).5 4 Additionally,
it defines "employee" as any person who provided service to an em-
ployer, whether or not they ever received payment for their serv-
ices. 55
Facts, data and opinions are all covered by this immunity. 5 6 The
new law provides some measure of protection to an employer who
communicates information about a person's professional conduct,
reasons for separation, job performance, attendance history, discipli-
nary actions and productivity, as well as information contained in
written performance evaluations.'57 All such communications should
be job-related and narrowly tailored to avoid claims of bad faith.
Employers are presumed to have acted in good faith when re-
sponding to a prospective or current employer. 5 ' Therefore, a plain-
tiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence that an employer
acted in bad faith to overcome the presumption.'59 A plaintiff could
do this by showing that the employer disclosed the information un-
der one of the following three circumstances: (1) with knowledge that
the information was false; (2) with reckless disregard for whether it
was false or not; or (3) with the intent to deliberately mislead.60
Should a plaintiff meet this elevated burden and prove bad faith, the
employer will lose its immunity and may be vulnerable. Plaintiffs
nonetheless probably will not be deterred from bringing defamation
and retaliation claims in reliance on the "bad faith" provision.
The new law applies only to claims that arise on or after July 1,
2000.161 Until the immunity under this new law is tested in the
courts, employers would be wise to limit the information they give in
employment references, as they have done in the past. Additionally,
152. Id. § 8.01-46.1(C) (Repl. Vol. 2000).
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. Id. § 8.01-46.1 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
156. See id.
157. See id.
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prospective employers should consider the use of background and
criminal history checks to assist them in making wise hiring deci-
sions and to avoid potential negligent hiring claims. To obtain such
information, the Fair Credit Reporting Act requires proper disclo-
sures and authorizations. 62
IV. COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE AND THE
FIDUCIARY DUTY OF LOYALTY
Cases involving the duties, created by both an employee's inherent
fiduciary duties and contract, flowing from employee to employer
continued to receive a great deal of coverage in the Virginia courts.
In Cliff Simmons Roofing, Inc. v. Cash,163 the Rockingham County
Circuit Court addressed the enforceability of an employee non-
compete agreement that had no geographic restrictions.'" A few
months before leaving Cliff Simmons Roofing, the defendant signed
an "Employee Non-Compete Agreement" at the request of his em-
ployer. 6 5 The agreement stated in part that the defendant agreed
"not to directly or indirectly compete with the business of the com-
pany... for a period of one year."'66 "Not compete" was defined as
not being involved with another company as an employee, owner,
manager, operator, or consultant if the business was "substantially
similar to or competitive with" the company.'67 The company brought
a bill of complaint and an application for a temporary injunction to
enjoin the defendant from working in the roofing business. 68 Cash
filed a demurrer alleging that the Non-Compete Agreement was un-
reasonable and unenforceable as against public policy. 9
The court cited three criteria for determining the validity of a non-
compete agreement: (1) whether the restraint was reasonable in that
it was no greater than necessary to protect the employer's business
interests; (2) whether the restraint was reasonable and not unduly
oppressive in limiting the ability of the employee to earn a livelihood;
162. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a-1681t (1994 & Supp. 1998).
163. 49 Va. Cir. 156 (Cir. Ct. 1999) (Rockingham County).
164. Id. at 157.




169. Id. at 157.
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and (3) whether the restraint was reasonable as sound public pol-
icy. 7° The defendant's Non-Compete Agreement, according to the
court, was "clearly unenforceable" because it had no geographic
boundaries, effectively preventing him from working for a roofing
company anywhere in the United States.'' It also prevented the de-
fendant from working for a competing roofing company even in a po-
sition in which he could not use confidential information or play a
competing role with Cliff Simmons Roofing. 2 The court further
stated that it must strictly construe a non-compete agreement
against an employer and that it would not grant the company's re-
quest for an injunction limited to a restriction within its market
place. 3 To do so would be a selective enforcement of the agreement,
and the court did not have the authority to cure a defective instru-
ment in this way.'74 The court sustained the defendant's demurrer. 75
Similarly, in Leddy v. Communication Consultants, Inc.,'76 an em-
ployer sought to enforce a non-compete agreement, the terms of
which were somewhat ambiguous.' While employed by Communi-
cation Consultants, Inc. ("CCI"), the plaintiff entered into a contract
with his employer that prohibited him from soliciting any client of
CCI for two years after termination of his employment. 7 ' The con-
tract banned both direct and indirect solicitation of clients, defined
as persons or business entities to which CCI sold advertising or pub-
lic relations services during the two years prior to the plaintiffs ter-
mination.'79 The contract did not include any geographic restric-
tion. 8 ° Based on these facts, the plaintiff asked the court to grant
him a declaratory judgment.' 8 '
The plaintiff had four major arguments against enforcement of the
agreement.'82 First, he contended that the non-solicitation clause




173. Id. at 157-58.
174. See id. at 158.
175. Id.
176. No. CH99-3952, slip op. at 1 (Va. Cir. Ct. Apr. 5, 2000) (Virginia Beach City).
177. See id. at 2.
178. Id. at 1-2.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See id. at 1.
182. See id. at 2.
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was per se unreasonable because it did not include a geographic
limitation." Second, he contended it was overly broad to ban per-
formance of any services currently provided by CCI to its clients.'
Third, the plaintiff argued that the agreement was overreaching be-
cause the type of communications incorporated in "indirect solicita-
tion" were not defined. 85 Finally, he argued that prohibiting contact
with any client from the past two years, even if it was no longer as-
sociated with CCI, was overly restrictive. 86
The court recognized that restraints of trade are not favored under
Virginia law and that the burden of proving the reasonableness of
the restraint was on CCI. 87 It articulated the criteria (mentioned in
the previous case) for determining the reasonableness of a non-
solicitation covenant in an employment contract: (1) whether the re-
straint is greater that necessary to protect the employer's business
interests; (2) whether the restraint is unduly harsh or oppressive in
limiting the former employee's ability to earn a livelihood; and (3)
whether the restraint is sound public policy."8
The court determined that the agreement protected a legitimate
business interest and that because an employer should be able to
preserve its client base, the agreement was not facially violative of
public policy.'89 As to the third factor of the reasonableness test, the
court pointed out a distinction between a geographic limit in which
the former employee cannot conduct business and a time limit dur-
ing which the employee cannot contact the employer's clients. 9 '
While a geographic limit, or the lack thereof, may be too restrictive,
the court found a time limit permissible as long as enough potential
customers remained available to the former employee. 9'
At this point, a few factual questions remained unanswered: (1)
whether a pool of non-restricted clients were available to the plain-
tiff and (2) whether the time limit in the agreement was overly





187. Id. at 3.




192. Id. at 4.
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the prohibition of indirect solicitation because the Supreme Court of
Virginia had earlier held such a restriction reasonable.'93 Because
factual issues were still in dispute, the court overruled the motion
for summary judgment.'94
The Henrico County Circuit Court assessed the validity of a broad
and ambiguous non-compete agreement in Lawrence v. Business
Communications of Virginia, Inc.195 In 1994, the plaintiff began
working for Business Communications of Virginia ("BCV") as an out-
side salesperson, selling cell phones, pagers, and long-distance serv-
ice.'96 She had substantial customer contact and was a top salesper-
son."'97 Eventually she was asked, under threat of termination, to
sign a non-compete agreement stating in part that she would not en-
gage in the business of selling cell phones, pagers or other products
sold by BCV for the duration of the non-compete agreement. 198 The
agreement defined the geographic area for non-competition as "a ra-
dius of fifty (50) miles from any location [in which] the Company op-
erates during the duration of this Agreement."'99 The agreement's
duration was two years from the date of the plaintiffs termination of
employment with BCV.200
The court imposed the following criteria to determine the validity
of non-compete agreements: (1) whether the restraint is greater than
necessary to protect the employer's business interests; (2) whether
the restraint is unduly harsh or oppressive on the former employee's
efforts to earn a livelihood; and (3) whether the restraint is sound
public policy.20' At the outset of its opinion, the court called the cove-
nant ambiguous, saying it was "akin to an amoebae [sic]. "202 When
such an instrument is ambiguous, all reasonable inferences must be
given to the employee.20 ' The court labeled the agreement "too over-
broad" and, in examining the first criterion, the court found the re-
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. No. CH99-1134, slip op. at 1 (Va. Cir. Ct. May 5, 2000) (Henrico County).
196. Id. at 1.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 2.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 2-3 (citing Paramount-Termite Control Co., Inc. v. Rector, 238 Va. 171, 174,
380 S.E.2d 922, 924 (1989)).
202. Id. at 3.
203. Id. (citing Baird v. Dodson Bros. Exterminating Co., 217 Va. 745, 749, 232 S.E.2d
770, 773 (1977)).
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straint to be greater than necessary for BCV to protect its business
interests. °4 There were few limitations in the covenant; BCV did not
even limit the non-compete agreement to the type of business con-
ducted during the plaintiffs employment. °5 In addition, the agree-
ment was too broad geographically because it prohibited the plaintiff
from competing with any branch of BCV, whether it existed at the
time of her employment or not.20 6 By way of example, the court hy-
pothesized that the plaintiff could open a store in an area where
BCV did not operate at the time, only to be forced to close if BCV
later decided to enter that market or one within fifty miles.0 7
Finally, the court found that the agreement "offend[ed] public
policy because it restrain[ed] Lawrence's trade and promote[d] BCV
as a monopoly."208 In essence, the agreement constituted an undue
restriction of free trade or competition.20 9 Based on its unreasonable-
ness under any of the three criteria, the court declined to enforce the
non-compete agreement.2 0 The court, therefore, overruled BCV's
motion to strike.21'
The Supreme Court of Virginia dealt with the issue of breach of fi-
duciary duty in Feddeman & Co., C.P.A., P.C. v. Langan Associates,
P.C.212 Officers and directors ("buyers' group") of Feddeman & Com-
pany. ("Feddeman") sought to purchase a ninety-five percent interest
in the company and effect a merger with Langan Associates ("Lan-
gan"). 2"8 Eventually negotiations wore down, and the buyers' group
approached Langan about resigning from Feddeman and working for
it if the purchase of the interest in Feddeman did not occur.21 4 The
buyers' group began meeting during non-business hours away from
the company premises to discuss options and sought legal counsel to
determine how to leave Feddeman lawfully, informing the attorney
that its members were not subject to a non-compete agreement.215
The attorney, who admittedly was also counsel to Langan, advised
204. Id.
205. See id.
206. See id. at 4.
207. Id.




212. 260 Va. 35, 530 S.E.2d 668 (2000).
213. Id. at 38, 530 S.E.2d at 670.
214. Id. at 40, 530 S.E.2d at 671.
215. Id. at 38, 530 S.E.2d at 670.
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the group on how to resign lawfully.216 The buyers' group followed
that advice, resigning their positions with Feddeman when it became
clear that the purchase would be unsuccessful.217 Meanwhile, Fed-
deman, fearful of a walkout, contacted the accounting firm Johnson
& Lambert for assistance and discussed a possible merger in the fu-
ture.1 8
After hiring the buyers' group, Langan ultimately offered posi-
tions to other Feddeman employees. 1 9 These offers were made after
the buyers' group submitted its resignations.22 ° In addition, the new
Langan employees solicited clients from Feddeman.22' Within one
day, they had contacted all Feddeman clients, half of whom trans-
ferred their business to Langan.22' After fifty percent of Feddeman's
clients and twenty-five of its employees had left, Feddeman filed suit
alleging business conspiracy, breach of fiduciary duty, tortious inter-
ference with contracts, and usurpation of business opportunities.223
A jury awarded Feddeman $3,300,000 in damages. 2  Langan filed
and was granted a Motion to Strike and To Set Aside the Verdict.225
Feddeman appealed the trial judge's ruling.226
In reviewing the trial court's decision to set aside the jury verdict,
the supreme court examined whether there was sufficient evidence
to establish the claims against Langan, giving all reasonable infer-
ences to Feddeman.227 The court first determined that although the
employees had the right to make preparations to resign, that right
had to be balanced with fairness to the employer.122 Where employ-
ees misused confidential information or solicited clients and other
employees prior to resignation, their actions could constitute a
breach of fiduciary duty.229 According to the court, that determina-
tion had to be made on a case-by-case basis, and it cited cases from
216. Id. at 38-39, 530 S.E.2d at 670.
217. Id. at 39-40, 530 S.E.2d at 671.
218. Id. at 39, 530 S.E.2d at 671.
219. Id. at 40, 530 S.E.2d at 671.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 40-41, 530 S.E.2d at 671.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 40-41, 530 S.E.2d at 671-72.
224. Id. at 41, 530 S.E.2d at 672.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 41-44, 530 S.E.2d at 672-73.
228. Id. at 42, 530 S.E.2d at 672.
229. Id.
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other jurisdictions in which similar en masse resignations that crip-
pled an employer's business, were actionable breaches of fiduciary
duty." ° In the case at bar, the buyers' group knew that their actions
would severely damage Feddeman.23 ' Additionally, the trial court
specifically instructed the jury both that employees must act in good
faith toward their employer and that those resigning could not use
confidential company information or solicit other employees or cli-
ents to join them. 2 The court decided that the actions of the buyers'
group, when viewed as a whole, presented sufficient credible evi-
dence for the jury to determine that a breach of fiduciary duty ex-
isted. 3 Setting aside the jury verdict was an error.234
Feddeman also alleged that the intentional conspiracy between
Langan and the buyers' group to injure Feddeman's business vio-
lated Virginia Code sections 18.2-499 and 18.2-500, which led to fi-
nancial harm.235 Jury instructions required the plaintiff to prove that
the parties combined to maliciously and willfully damage Fedde-
man's business and that the business was actually damaged. 236 The
supreme court, however, stated that it was not necessary to prove
that the primary purpose of the buyers' group and Langan was to
injure Feddeman, but only that they acted "intentionally, purpose-
fully, and without lawful justification."' 7 Because all reasonable in-
ferences had to be afforded to the plaintiff, the court determined that
sufficient evidence existed to justify a finding of intentional action by
the defendants.23' The buyers' group plan was based on the idea that
the threat of resignations and loss of clients would force Feddeman
to lower the cost of the buyout or suffer the consequences. 239 With
this evidence available to the jury, the trial court erred in its deci-
sion to overturn the jury verdict in favor of Feddeman.24 ° In conclu-
230. Id. at 42-44, 530 S.E.2d at 672-73 (citing ABC Trans Nat'l Trans., Inc. v. Aeronau-
tics Forwarders, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 1299 (IlM. App. Ct. 1980); Duane Jones Co. v. Burke, 117
N.E.2d 237 (Ct. App. N.Y. 1954)).
231. Id. at 43, 530 S.E.2d at 673.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 43-44, 530 S.E.2d at 673.
234. Id. at 44, 530 S.E.2d at 673.
235. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-499, -500 (Repl. Vol. 1999)).
236. Id. at 44, 530 S.E.2d at 673-74.
237. Id. at 45, 530 S.E.2d at 674 (quoting Advance Marine Enter. v. PRC Inc., 256 Va.
106, 117, 501 S.E.2d 148, 154-55 (1998)).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 45-46, 530 S.E.2d at 675-76.
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sion, the supreme court reversed the trial court's decision to overturn
the verdicts on the counts of breach of fiduciary duty and conspiracy
to injure another's business.24'
V. CONCLUSION
Clearly employment and labor law in Virginia has been affected
by several important decisions over the past year. The law pertain-
ing to wrongful discharge claims continues to evolve. Under the
Mitchem decision, a new avenue for potential relief is available to
plaintiffs under the Bowman doctrine. Mitchem appears to represent
the most apparent shift in this area of the law, affording a potential
claim that appeared to have been foreclosed by prior decisions of the
Supreme Court of Virginia.
Plaintiffs continue to follow a national trend in pursuing claims
against employers under common law negligence theories. Decisions
of the past year recognize the continuing unavailability of negligent
supervision claims, while confirming the viability of negligent hiring
and retention claims. These decisions have further fleshed out the
standards for such claims and provide guidance for practitioners in-
volved in litigation involving these theories.
It is unclear to what extent the recent legislation involving em-
ployment references will affect the amount and types of information
provided by former employers to prospective employers. Perhaps this
new law will bring about a freer exchange of information among em-
ployers, thus enabling them to make more meaningful hiring deci-
sions. Despite the well-intentioned purposes behind the act, how-
ever, prudent employers most likely will continue their restrictive
practices with regard to employment references until claims involv-
ing the new qualified immunity provide additional guidance.
The Feddeman decision highlights the risk inherent in en masse
resignations for the purpose of competing with a prior employer.
Even in the absence of enforceable covenants not to compete, em-
ployees must walk the fine line between merely preparing to com-
pete with an employer and breaching the fiduciary duty of loyalty
241. Id. at 47, 530 S.E.2d at 675. In a footnote, the court commented that usurpation of
business opportunity is not generally a distinct cause of action, but instead, is a type of
breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 47 n.1, 530 S.E.2d at 675 n.1.
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owed to the employer. Other cases from the past year recite the well-
established standards for the evaluation of non-compete agreements
and turn on the unique circumstances presented in those cases.

